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DISCUSSION 
TRUTH WRONGED: CRISPIN WRIGHT’S TRUTH 
AND OBJECTIVITY 
Ian Rumfitt 
This book reproduces, with some supplements and revisions, the 
content of Professor Wright’s Waynflete Lectures, delivered at 
Oxford in 1991. Although their literary style could not be described 
as conversational, there are other respects in which the book 
betrays its origin. Especially in the earlier chapters, there is little 
actual citation or close discussion of writings by other philosophers, 
even when Wright is locating his own position in part by reference 
to their theories; moreover, as the preface readily concedes, many 
questions are left undecided. More worrying, perhaps, is a certain 
sketchiness in many of the arguments: some concepts central to 
those arguments nowhere receive the detailed analysis that would 
be needed for full argumentative explicitness. As I think the 
discussion below will show, this is certainly true of Wright’s 
treatment of assertion. 
The book’s aim is to consider - or to reconsider - the manner in 
which debates between ‘realists’ and ‘anti-realists’ over various 
disciplines might best be conducted. However, although Wright 
alludes to such debates - for example, over realism in ethics and in 
the philosophy of mathematics - little space is devoted to their 
details, and the book soars serenely at a pretty stratospheric level of 
generality, for the most part untroubled by the turbulence created 
by specific disputes. Readers who are not antecedently convinced 
that there are important ‘family resemblances’ between such 
debates should be warned that they may find utterly alien the 
book’s very point of departure. 
In  relation to its aim, the book divides naturally into two 
unequal parts. In the first, which is complete by the middle of the 
third chapter, Wright attempts to re-orient debates about realism 
SO that they focus less upon the question whether the utterances of a 
given discipline are susceptible of assessment as true or as false. 
Indeed, i t  is said, when the predicate ‘true’ is properly understood, 
this question emerges as having little interest: it will be reasonably 
uncontroversial that moral utterances, utterances about what is 
funny, &c., are apt to be true or false. In Wright’s own words, then 
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‘truth [or falsity] need not be the exclusive property of realism’ 
(p. 12). In the second and longer part, Wright explores a number of 
concepts in whose terms the debate about realism might instead 
proceed. Centrally, he discusses the notions: 
( 1 )  of cognitive command: which a ‘discourse’ will exhibit just 
when it is apriori that differences of opinion between participants 
can be explained only by positing some cognitive shortcoming 
(whether of ignorance, inattention, or prejudice) on the part of at 
least one of them (pp. 92-93); 
(2) of detectivism: which a discourse will exhibit if the best 
judgements made by its participants track facts in rebus. Such a 
discourse is to be contrasted with one in which the best 
judgements of its participants constitute the truth grounds of its 
claims (cfr. esp. pp. 79-80); 
(3) of width o f  cosmological role: which a discourse exhibits to the 
degree that its judgements explain things other than - or other 
than via - subjects’ being in the attitudinal states expressed by 
such .judgements. 
Realism about a discourse, then, is vindicated to the degree that it 
exhibits cognitive command, is detectivist, and displays a wide 
cosmological role. 
Interesting as are many of the reflections in this second part, 
their exploratory nature makes them comparatively resistant to 
quick summary and assessment. Accordingly, I shall devote the 
remainder of this notice to the main arguments of the first part of 
the book, i.e. to Wright’s views about truth, and aptness for 
assessment as true or as false. 
Wright begins his discussion of truth by attempting to refute the 
account of it that he calls deflationary, and which he characterizes by 
the following two theses (formulated most explicitly on p. 30): 
(a) that ‘true’ functions purely as a device for endorsing 
assertions, beliefs and so on . . . and which therefore 
registers no norm distinct from justified endorsability - that 
is, assertibility; 
(b) that the disquotational schema [viz. the schema ‘p’ is true if 
and only if p] constitutes a complete explanation of the 
meaning of the word ‘true’. 
(The notion of ‘registering a norm’ is left somewhat obscure, but I 
suppose that a predicate P registers a norm N just when N lays 
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down some rule which guides the application of P.) The contention 
of (a), then, is that the only norm constraining the application of 
the truth predicate to a sentence is whichever norm constrains the 
assertibility of the sentence itself. 
Wright undertakes to show that these two elements are 
incoherent whenever a discourse admits neutral states of information 
- i.e. states of information which, for some sentence in the 
discourse, warrant neither its assertion nor its denial. For the 
disquotational schema yields: 
‘It is not the case that p’ is true if and only if it is not the case 
that p 
and also (given an unexceptionable logical principle) : 
It  is not the case that p if and only if it is not the case that ‘p’ is 
true 
and these together deliver: 
‘It is not the case that p’ is true if and only if it is not the case that 
‘p’ is true. 
But if ‘p’ is a sentence for which a state of information is neutral, ‘it 
is not the case that p’ will be unwarranted even though ‘p’ is not 
warranted. Accordingly, in any such case the extension of ‘is true’ 
demonstrably diverges from the extension of ‘is warranted’. We 
are, then, ‘forced to recognize that while “is [true]” and “is 
warrantedly assertible” are normatively coincident, satisfaction of 
the one norm does not entail satisfaction of the other’ (p. 21). This 
is presented as ‘a fundamental and decisive objection to deflationism 
as classically conceived’ (ibid.). 
This claim, however, is surely grossly inflated. Wright’s deflation- 
ist is struck (quite justly) by the likeness exhibited by the norms 
which regulate the application of the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is 
warrantedly assertible’. Indeed, the likeness extends to both 
positive and negative norms in Wright’s sense (cf. p. 15) so that we 
have 
The predicate ‘is true’ may be applied to any sentence for which 
one has a warrant 
standing alongside 
The predicate ‘is warrantedly assertible’ may be applied to any 
sentence for which one has a warrant; 
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and 
The predicate ‘is true’ may not be applied to any sentence for 
which one lacks a warrant 
standing alongside 
The predicate ‘is warrantedly assertible’ may not be applied to 
any sentence for which one lacks a warrant. 
Now the divergence to which Wright draws attention arises 
because this parallel does not extend to the norms which regulate 
application of the negations of these predicates. So, while we have: 
The predicate ‘is not warrantedly assertible’ may be applied to 
any sentence for which one lacks a warrant, 
we don’t have: 
The predicate ‘is not true’ may be applied to any sentence for 
which one lacks a warrant. 
I t  is, however, hard to see why Wright takes this to be a deep 
problem for the deflationary conception of truth. For cognate to the 
notion of affirming something is the notion of denying it; and cognate 
to the notion of having a warrant for affirming something is the 
notion of having a warrant for denying it (or, for brevity, having an 
anti-warrant). And, with these cognate notions in play, it is 
straightforward to formulate the norm which does regulate the 
application of ‘is not true’, viz. 
The predicate ‘is not true’ may be applied to any sentence for 
which one possesses an anti-warrant. 
Indeed, this norm is needed to account for the universal assertibility 
of the disquotational biconditionals, for a sentence’s negation is 
also assertible just when one possesses an anti-warrant for it. To be 
sure, clause (a) of Wright’s characterization of deflationism needs 
to be emended so that it reads: 
(a’) that ‘is true’ and ‘is not true’ function purely as devices for 
endorsing and rejecting assertions, beliefs and so on . . . and which 
therefore register no norms distinct from justified assertibility 
and justajied deniability. 
However, such an emendation seems entirely in the spirit of 
deflationary views; certainly, we remain far from the ‘metaphysic- 
ally substantial’ notions of truth at which the deflationist charac- 
teristically balks. 
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Of greater moment, however, is Wright’s own account of the 
truth predicate, for it is this that underpins his contention that 
truth need not be the exclusive property of realism. Wright 
recommends a ‘kind of minimalism about truth . . . The minimalist 
view is that when a predicate has been shown to have the relevant 
features, and to have them for the right reasons, there is no further 
question about the propriety of regarding it as a truth predicate. 
Minimalism is thus in principle open to the possibility of a pluralist 
view of truth: there may be a variety of notions, operating within 
distinct discourses, which pass the test’ (pp. 24-25). The ‘features’ 
in question are that a truth predicate conforms to the disquotational 
schema, and that its extension potentially diverges from that of a 
warranted assertibility predicate. And a predicate will possess 
these features for the right reason if the features in some way derive 
from a number of basic ‘platitudes’ which Wright takes to be 
fundamentally constitutive of truth: for example, the platitude that 
to assert a proposition is to claim that it is true (p. 24) .  
It  is this conception that underlies Wright’s approach to the 
question of which discourses are composed of utterances susceptible 
of assessment as true or false - i.e. (in Wright’s handy if unlovely 
phrase) of which discourses arc truth-apt. ‘My suggestion’, he 
writes, ‘is that since any predicate should be accounted a truth 
predicate which has just the features highlighted by minimalism, 
any discourse may count as truth-apt on which it is possible to 
define a predicate with just those features. And the condition for 
the definability of such a predicate is merely that the discourse be 
one of assertion, that its utterances be governed by norms of 
warranted assertibility’ (pp. 27-28). However, as Wright clearly 
sees (p. 28), this by itself does not show that an anti-realist about a 
discourse ought to be insouciant about conceding its truth-aptness. 
Rather, what he needs to show in addition is that the anti-realist 
should be insouciant about conceding that the discourse in 
question is assertoric. 
His attempt to demonstrate this has an appealing directness: 
there is no notion of genuine - deep - assertoric content, such 
that a discourse which exhibits whatever degree of discipline 
(there are firmly acknowledged standards of proper and improper 
use of its ingredient sentences) and which has all the overt 
syntactic trappings of assertoric content (resources for - apparent 
- conditionalization, negation, embedding within propositional 
attitudes and so on) - no notion of genuine assertion such that a 
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discourse with all this may nevertheless fail to be in the business 
of expressing genuine assertions, Rather, if things are in all these 
surface aspects as if assertions are being made, then so they are 
(P. 29). 
But, direct as it may be, this claim strikes me as quite indefensible. 
There is, to be sure, some indeterminacy in what the claim 
actually amounts to, indeterminacy which stems from unclarity in 
the notion of a discourse. It  would certainly be uncharitable to 
attribute to Wright the claim that any ‘disciplined’ utterance of any 
sentence of some appropriate syntactic kind qualifies as an 
assertion: the pronouncements of utterances on the stage are 
paradigms of non-assertive utterance and yet it is open to a 
playwright to put sentences of any syntactic form into the mouths 
of his characters. This shows, I take it, that utterances on the stage 
do not constitute a ‘discourse’ in Wright’s sense; and we might 
speculate that those who participate in a discourse must do so with 
an earnestness lacking in actors on a stage. 
Even setting to one side the considerable problem of explicating 
the relevant notion of earnestness, other grounds for doubting 
Wright’s claim crowd in. It is, for example, notoriously hard to 
construct a syntactic criterion which distinguishes those utterances 
which Austin liked to call performatives from those he designated 
constatives. Moreover, many of them are tightly disciplined in 
Wright’s sense: there are ‘firmly acknowledged standards of proper 
and improper use’ of the sentences used in declaring war, making 
bets, launching ships, marrying somebody, &c. &c. And yet, 
whatever we make of Austin’s denial that performatives are truth- 
apt, he was surely right to deny that such performatives are 
assertions, and that the sentences used in making them are 
assertoric. An utterance qualifies as an assertion only if i t  may be 
reported in the style ‘The speaker asserted, or claimed, that such- 
and-such is this case’; but it is hard to see what report in this style 
could truly be made of ‘We declare war on Germany’, ‘I bet you 
sixpence that it will not rain’ or ‘I name this ship the Queen 
Eli&eth’. Furthermore, there are examples which create difficulties 
in the other direction. A debate rages, for instance, over whether 
utterances of vernacular conditionals constitute assertions. How- 
ever, vernaculars differ from formal languages in resisting the nested 
embedding of conditionals. Even so simple a case as ‘If if it rains 
then the match will be cancelled then the rules of the cricket club 
are being misapplied’ is not a sentence of English, so that 
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conditionals fail to display one of Wright’s ‘overt syntactic 
trappings of assertoric content’. I take it, though, that few will be 
prepared to conclude just on that ground that they are not 
assertoric. 
I t  may, however, be replied to all of this that Wright’s direct 
claim about assertion goes beyond what he really needs. Some 
philosophers, after all, have been prepared to ascribe conditions of 
truth and falsity to ironical remarks, jokes, and other utterances 
that we should not normally regard as assertive. Given, then, that 
this is at least an open possibility, Wright need not claim that 
various discourses are uncontroversially assertoric in order to 
sustain his main contention, that they are uncontroversially truth- 
apt. We might ask, then, after the prospects of an argument to this 
conclusion which side-steps any consideration of the nature of 
assertion. 
Such prospects, I fear, are dim. Wright himself plausibly 
requires that a truth-apt sentence yield an instance of the 
disquotational schema: if ‘p’ is apt for assessment as true or false, 
then there must be conditions under which it is true and/or 
conditions under which it is false, and as a statement of those 
conditions we can hardly hope to improve upon 
‘p’ is true if and only if p. 
But, even leaving aside the obvious problem over whether an 
instance of this schema can be true if ‘p’ fails to be truth-apt, there 
are problems over its assertibility. For when is a vernacular 
biconditional assertible? Presumably, when both of its component 
conditionals are assertible. Yet (on the most plausible view of the 
matter) a vernacular conditional is assertible to the degree that one 
is prepared to assert the consequent, given a preparedness to assert 
the antecedent. But then, as it seems, there is no hope after all of 
avoiding engagement with the issue, whether it makes sense to 
speak of asserting that p. 
The significance of this problem for Wright’s general project can 
hardly be overestimated. A plausible view of assertion (essentially 
Frege’s view) takes utterances to be assertive just when they 
purport to express beliefs: accordingly, a type sentence will be 
assertoric only when it is apt for the expression of a belief. But 
whether the putatively assertoric sentences of a discourse qualify as 
expressive of beliefs is a deep question over which a realist and an 
anti-realist will typically disagree. Indeed, spelling out what is at 
issue between them here will typically involve a number of the 
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notions to whose elucidation Wright devotes the second part of his 
book. But in that case aptness for truth or falsity has not after all 
been dislodged as a litmus test for realism. And Wright has not 
shown that truth need not be the exclusive property of realism. 
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